by Lorenzo Trombetta

(ANSA) – SEP 4 2024 – United by the fear of being sidelined in the shifting sands of Middle Eastern realpolitik, the Kurdish-Syrian leaders in the northeast and their fierce rivals from the Islamist opposition in the northwest are hoping to delay, for as long as possible, the dreaded normalisation of relations between Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad.

But two recent developments suggest Ankara may be sending a clear signal to both its Islamist allies in Idlib and its Kurdish adversaries in Qamishli. The resumption of Turkish-Russian military patrols in northeastern Syria—just a stone’s throw from Kurdish positions—after a year-long hiatus, and Turkey’s new requirement that Syrians wishing to return from Turkey must hold Syrian passports issued by Damascus, point in that direction.

In Syria, a country crippled by Western sanctions and over 13 years of war, Assad, propped up by Russia and Iran, said in late August that talks with Erdogan need not wait for Turkey’s troops to withdraw from Idlib. This shift was followed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s optimistic remarks about an imminent meeting among officials from Turkey, Syria, Russia, and Iran aimed at fast-tracking the normalisation process between Ankara and Damascus.

The two countries, once bound by cordial ties, became sworn enemies in 2011. As Assad cracked down on anti-government protests, Erdogan threw his weight behind the opposition, facilitating its militarisation and the rise of Islamist radicalism.

Turkey, a NATO member, later intervened directly in the conflict, expanding its influence in the northwest and, in 2019, seizing territory in the northeast in an effort to curb the influence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK inspires the Kurdish-Syrian forces, who have been backed by the US in the fight against ISIS.

Lavrov recently appealed to Kurdish-Syrian authorities to abandon their alliance with Washington. He warned them of betrayal, likening their situation to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

A potential thaw between Ankara and Damascus, brokered by Moscow, could serve all three parties well. Turkey, under pressure at home due to the presence of over 3.5 million Syrian refugees and intent on pursuing its anti-PKK agenda, could achieve two goals with one move: facilitate the massive return of Syrians to northwest Syria and, together with Damascus, tighten the noose around the Kurdish-Syrian semi-autonomous region. 

For Russia, it would solidify its role as a key player in shaping the region’s future and force the US—which maintains around 900 troops in northeastern and eastern Syria—to reconsider its military presence, a withdrawal long called for by former president Donald Trump.

Assad, meanwhile, stands to regain —at least on paper— control of strategic, resource-rich territories and position himself as a stabilising player both at home and abroad. This comes amid tentative diplomatic overtures from some EU countries, including Italy, towards his government. (ANSA)